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Paradigms of Narcissism in The Woman in White
Loving Self-Reflection:
The relationships in Wilkie Collins’ novel, The Woman in White, 
resonate almost perfectly with both Freudian and Lacanian psy-
choanalytical theories of narcissistic impulses. Developed early 
in childhood, these impulses are said to motivate and structure 
our experiences of love. Though both theorists wrote after the 
publication of The Woman in White, the novel’s unexpected 
exemplification of their ideas suggests that the psychoanalytic 
approaches they developed may indeed articulate some of our 
more subconscious drives and impulses. 
 Much like the founda-tional myth of  Ovid, Wilkie Collins’ The Woman in White also opens onto a land-scape of  Narcissism. 
For Collins, though, the terrain has changed: 
his pennings deal not with literal pond-gaz-
ing, but with the more metaphorical manifes-
tations of  self-love and adoration that com-
prise the core of  his characters interactions 
with one another (and, for that matter, with 
themselves). But their particular vanities are 
various, ranging from comical hypochondria 
to a sensational and heroic love that serves 
to self-aggrandize rather than self-sacrifice. 
The narcissisms embodied by Collins’ char-
acters Fredrick Fairlie, Walter Hartwritght, 
and Laura Fairlie are not Ovidian as much 
as they are Freudian and Lacanian, with each 
figure fitting into a different psychoanalytic 
archetype of  (self)love. 
Sigmund Freud’s writings on narcissism, 
when read alongside The Woman in White, 
suggest a shockingly complicated picture of  
Frederick Fairlie’s character. Though the ec-
centric and rather odd uncle of  Laura Fairlie 
is a flawless depiction of  an exaggerated 
narcissism and ego-centricity, a more radical 
interpretation of  his character suggests that 
Fairlie is a far more complex expression of  
repressed psychological desires that lead him 
to, quite literally, fall in love with himself. His 
narcissism has progressed beyond the neces-
sary Primary Narcissism that Freud sees in 
all individuals and has distorted into a total-
izing Secondary Narcissism that manifests as 
hypochondria and is explained by an implicit 
coding of  Fairlie’s character as homosexual. 
In Freud’s 1914 essay, “On Narcissism: 
An Introduction,” he suggests that narcis-
sistic tendencies may not, as previously 
assumed, be a disorder, but are more likely 
a normative state of  being. Freud theorized 
that individuals function with the capacity 
for two different types of  libido: ego-libido 
and object-libido. Ego-libido (narcissism) 
“is the libidinal compliment to the egoism 
of  the instinct of  self-preservation” and 
constitutes an essential piece of  “healthy” 
individuals.2 It is, as Freud terms it, a Pri-
mary Narcissism. Object-libido, then, is that 
section of  desire that has been directed at 
objects external to the self  and is typically 
associated with the love of  or desire for 
another person. 
Freud imagines libido as a fixed quan-
tity within the mind, thereby implying that 
ego-libido and object-libido are engaged in a 
constant exchange with one another. In cases 
when the individual’s development of  the 
libidinal stage is somehow “disrupted,” how-
ever, the individual may never fully develop 
an object-libido. This results in Second-
ary Narcissism, or a psychological disorder 
where the libido withdraws its attention from 
the outside world and focuses entirely on an 
obsession with the self, as seen in cases of  
hypochondria and megalomania. 
Thus the type of  hypochondria exhibited 
by Fredrick Fairlie’s character develops when 
the self  becomes so obsessed with itself  that 
it essentially begins to see the entire external 
world as a threat to either health or sanity. 
Fairlie’s preoccupation with “the wretched 
state of  [his] nerves”3 which he mentions, 
without fail, in every conversation he has, 
is the primary locus of  his hypochondriac 
obsession; he is, by his own estimation, 
“nothing but a bundle of  nerves dressed up 
to look like a man.”4 Consumed by thoughts 
 “…[H]e saw before his eyes
A form, a face, and loved with leaping heart
A hope unreal and thought the shape was real. 
Spellbound he saw himself and motionless
Lay like a marble statue staring down…
All he admires that all admire in him
Himself he longs for, longs unwittingly, 
Praising is praised, desiring is desired,
And love he kindles while with love he burns…
Not knowing what he sees, he adores the sight;
That false face fools and fuels his delight.
You simple boy, why strive in vain to catch 
A fleeting image? What you see is nowhere;
And what you love—but turn away—you lose!
You see a phantom of a mirrored shape;
Nothing itself; with you it came and stays;
With you it too will go, if you can go!”1 
(Ovid, 3.415-438)
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of  his body, his “nerves,” his mental stabil-
ity, his physical health, Fairlie often uses his 
“poor health” or “weak nerves” as excuses 
to either enact his own desire without be-
ing held socially responsible or to redirect 
conversation back to himself  when it has 
strayed to other topics. He manipulates his 
“illness” as a way to control the characters 
around him, insisting that the voices of  chil-
dren, the banging of  doors, and the dirt on 
visitors’ shoes are all things that will disturb 
his health, thereby enacting his own wishes 
without necessarily having to view himself  
as narcissistic. The extremity of  Fairlie’s self-
love is even noticed by Walter Hartright who, 
upon his first encounter with Mr. Fairlie, 
observes that his “self-affectation and [his] 
wretched nerves [mean] one and the same 
thing.”5 Fairlie’s self-absorption far surpasses 
any “normal” type of  Primary Narcissism 
envisioned by Freud and so falls into the 
category of  psychological disorders covered 
by Secondary Narcissism.  
Interestingly, Freud often connects cases 
of  libidinal disturbance with homosexuality 
and sexual “perversion,” implying that ho-
mosexuals6 over-develop their ego-libido and 
become in some way clinically narcissistic, 
crafting obsessions either with themselves or 
some illusion of  their self.7 This tendency to-
wards narcissism results as a response to the 
super-ego’s repression of  their normal object 
desires—namely, individuals of  the same 
sex—which forces the object-libido down 
while simultaneously increasing the ego-
libido. But this repression results in a more 
complex expression of  narcissism because 
the ego has now been forced to recognize 
a flaw in itself. The self ’s desires are trans-
gressive; unquestioning self-idolization and 
obsession are thus impossible. As a response, 
then, an “ideal ego” is created, which takes 
the place of  the actual ego and projects to 
the individual an idealized (but falsified) im-
age of  himself.8
Since Fairlie’s brand of  ego-libido is not 
directed at his own Real ego, but aimed at an 
ideal ego—Fairlie’s own aggrandized illusion 
of  himself—the reading of  his character 
as “homosexual” seems an almost perfect 
Freudian case. Momentarily suspended in 
this Freudian immersion (and temporar-
ily setting aside his theoretical “inaccura-
cies”), Fairlie’s love for his ideal-ego, the ego 
that falsely sees itself  as “one of  the most 
easy-tempered creatures that ever lived,” 9 
with each other. But, from the first mo-
ment that they meet, Laura’s role as Walter’s 
figurative “looking-glass” is made quite 
clear. Walter’s first description of  Laura’s 
physical form covers all of  the traditional 
characteristics commonly recounted on a 
first encounter—dress, hair color, stature, 
demeanor—but as he continues he devotes 
to idealize him and love him dependently. 
He essentially shapes her perception of  him 
to fit his own narcissistic idealization of  
himself: a strong, masculine teacher, worthy 
of  admiration despite his class status as her 
drawing master. 
Like Fairlie, then, Walter’s desire is also 
for an ideal; but in this case, the yearning is 
best explained by the “Ideal-I” of  Jacques 
Lacan rather than the Narcissism of  Freud. 
Lacanian theories on the gaze, desire, and 
narcissism pivot on the conception of  how 
the Castration Complex—part of  Freud’s 
Oedipal Complex—structures and destabi-
lizes our ideas of  ourselves as autonomous 
agents. 14 Essentially, Lacan posits that the 
mirror stage, a formative time in pre-linguis-
tic early childhood when we first recognize 
an “image” of  ourselves and thus begin to 
view ourselves as subjects, is both the begin-
ning of  the “self ” and the beginning of  the 
self ’s internal anxiety and desire. For Lacan, 
a fundamental misrecognition occurs when 
we—internally fragmented and incomplete—
are presented with what appears to be a 
singular and cohesive external reflection of  
ourselves. As our infantile selves gaze at our 
own images and see ourselves as individuals, 
separate and self-contained, we (for the first 
time) construct a functional ideal of  a “self ” 
and the material body that corresponds to 
the stability and precision of  the reflection. 
This construction, Lacan then suggests, 
becomes the root of  all of  the anxious inse-
curity we (as subjects) feel later in our adult 
lives; we will never be able to resolve the 
feelings of  loss or lack that will perpetually 
plague us as we compare the perfection of  
the reflective image with the subjective expe-
rience of  an unstable and inconsistent self. 
Contradicting the logical assumption 
that mirrors would then be subconsciously 
shunned and avoided, always reminding us 
of  our shameful materiality and instability, 
Lacan concludes that we actually view them 
in just the opposite way, internally obsess-
ing over the image of  a stable, coherent, and 
unified whole. The wholeness of  this image 
fascinates us because it seems to present to 
us the “Ideal-I” (like Freud’s Ideal ego), or 
that image of  ourselves that we always want 
to be but never feel like we actually achieve. 
This complicated relationship signals our 
transition into the Imaginary Order, a psy-
chological structure predominately character-
ized by our perpetually narcissistic demand 
for the stability of  the mirror’s reflection. 
Our location in the Imaginary Order per-
sists until we acquire language—symbolically 
representative, for Lacan, of  the rules of  
culture, society, and law—and transition into 
the Symbolic Order (though he suggests that 
the narcissistic influence of  the Imaginary is 
always present, even in the Symbolic). In the 
Symbolic Order, the infant’s demand for the 
stability and unity of  the self  s/he sees in his 
or her mirror image morphs into the adult’s 
desire for objects that s/he views as reflecting 
back to him or her the stability s/he once 
saw in the mirror. Thus, all of  the relation-
ships we form (with role models, with love 
objects, etc.) are implicitly narcissistic in that 
they all cater to our own obsession with our 
“Ideal-I,” serving as warped looking-glasses 
that show us pictures of  ourselves that are 
more composed than we actually are. These 
objet petit a’s (objects of  our desire) function, 
then, merely as a screen for the projection 
of  our unending desire for our “Ideal-I,” 
thereby making any actual fulfillment of  our 
desire impossible—even through acquisi-
tion of  our objet petit a—because desire is 
ultimately concerned with an impossible 
return to wholeness with the mother, not 
with the object itself. It is a constant process 
of  projection and deferral. It is in this stage, 
also, that the final separation from the 
mother (and the maternal body) occurs; our 
assumption of  the patriarchal Symbolic—the 
Father’s code—necessitates a parallel denial 
of  the mother who must be excluded as a 
price for cultural recognition. 
The reflective surface of Laura’s eyes project to 
Walter the version of himself he instills in her, the 
version of himself as he has always wanted to be. 
results from his developmental repression 
of  those unacceptable object-libidos (other 
men) for whom his super-ego would never 
allow his id to express a desire. Unable to 
invest his libido in others, Fairlie instead 
turns all his desire inward, focusing it on an 
idealized version of  himself  rather than on 
his own flawed reality. This psychoanalytic 
theory then accounts for the stereotypi-
cal characterization of  homosexual men as 
vain, self-possessed, and essentially femi-
nized. For Freud, they, like women, never 
fully transfer into the world of  normative 
object-libido like heterosexual men because 
both homosexuals and women are socially 
limited in their ability to pursue the objects 
of  their desire. Permitted to love no one but 
himself  (even if  it is an inaccurate repre-
sentation of  himself), Fairlie’s extreme and 
even clinical narcissism suddenly transforms. 
Thus placed under Freud’s observant eye, 
Frederick Fairlie is no longer just an eccen-
tric and thoughtlessly self-centered uncle, 
he is now an instance of  a type; he has been 
diagnosed—known—for what he “truly” is: 
an exempla of  a Freudian mold. 
Frederick Fairlie is not, however, the 
only character consumed by visions of  his 
own image. Much like Fairlie, neither Walter 
Hartwright nor Laura Fairlie ever becomes 
consciously aware of  the underlying narcis-
sism that drives the relationship they have 
a disproportionate amount of  time to the 
recollection of  her eyes, “large and tender 
. . . beautiful above all things in the clear 
truthfulness of  the look that dwells in 
their innermost depths.”10 Walter’s fascina-
tion with Laura’s eyes, the metaphorical 
“looking-glass” of  the soul, is the first hint 
that his growing love and obsession with 
her mainly results from her transparency 
and reflectivity of  character. Walter loves 
her for the “clear truthfulness of  the look” 
she gives him, not because of  any particu-
lar character trait she herself  possesses. 
Her character is constructed as an empty 
vessel, carrying nothing innate or unique, 
and merely serving as a reflecting pool for 
the wishes, desires, beliefs, and interests 
of  the characters that surround her. Even 
Walter—who must strain himself  to see any 
of  Laura’s faults—is momentarily “troubled 
by a sense of  an incompleteness”11 in her 
nature that suggests to him “the idea of  
something wanting,” something lacking. 12 
Having no opinions of  her own, she will 
literally “believe all that [Walter] say[s] to 
[her],” 13 unquestionably reflecting back 
to him his own ideas and interests in each 
of  their encounters. Walter—in a fright-
fully colonial way—cultivates her mind and 
refines her talents, leaving such a perma-
nent and imbedded mark on her otherwise 
translucent mind that she has no option but 
“untitled” by Hannah Cochran
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Finally, Lacan’s notion of  desire in the 
Symbolic Order includes a phenomenon he 
terms “The Gaze.” For Lacan, The Gaze is 
not merely the subject’s act of  looking at 
an object of  desire, but also includes the 
subject’s (almost paranoid) realization that 
he is being gazed back at by the object. This 
realization is essentially one fraught with 
anxiety and insecurity because we are forced 
to realize that the “object” we are gazing 
at has the eerie ability to gaze back, almost 
threatening us with our own “Ideal-I” by 
forcing us to subconsciously recall the fact 
that we believe we lack much of  what our 
“object” reflects us to be. Thus, our relation-
ships with objects in the Symbolic Order are 
similar to our relationship with ourselves in 
the Imaginary Order; both are characterized 
by a simultaneous obsession with the image 
of  our ideal selves and a sense of  anxiety 
stirred by the fact that the image forces us to 
realize that, in the Real, we are not what we 
want (or pretend) to be. 
Logically, then, Walter’s desire for Laura 
deconstructs into an extension of  his infan-
tile Imaginary demand for his “Ideal-I”—the 
competent, unified, perfect self  his misrec-
ognizes in the mirror. The reflective surface 
of  Laura’s eyes project to Walter the version 
of  himself  he instills in her, the version of  
himself  as he has always wanted to be. When 
she reflects this romanticized idealization of  
himself  back to him, his Primary Narcissism 
assumes control and he, like Narcissus, is 
psychologically fated to fall in love with his 
own image. 
The text of  The Woman in White almost 
immediately alludes to the underlying prob-
lems structuring Laura and Walter’s desire for 
up against our own self-misrecognition.17 
When Laura looks at him, Walter ostensi-
bly recognizes her lack (after all, she is only 
a mirror); but, more subconsciously, he is 
unsettled because he is reminded of  his own 
shortcomings, his own “wanting” in com-
parison to the image she holds of  him. Thus 
their relationship is entirely “wanting”: one 
participant is completely translucent while 
the other is both in love with and unsettled 
by his own idealized reflection. 
This fundamental anxiety accounts for 
Walter’s almost obsessive drive to look at and 
which [he is] living, at once and forever.”18 
Although he verbally justifies his departure 
as necessary because of  Marian’s discovery 
of  his attraction to Laura and Laura’s preex-
isting engagement to Sir Percival Glyde, Wal-
ter actually determines to leave Laura days 
before Marian intervenes and informs him 
of  Laura’s fiancé. His acknowledgement of  
the “oppression” that he feels at Limmeridge 
is thus unconnected to Marian’s actions and 
can be seen as the result of  his own masoch-
istic desire to constantly pursue that which 
pains him (in this case, Laura Fairlie). Even-
tually, though, the internal conflict becomes 
too unbearable and Walter parts with Laura, 
leaving Limmeridge to seek some kind of  
mental peace elsewhere. 
Walter’s communications to Marian after 
his withdrawal from Limmeridge inform her 
that he plans to leave London, hoping to 
be “among new scenes and new people”19 
by taking up a post on a ship sailing to the 
“ruined cities of  Central America.”20 Essen-
tially, Walter, thus far a sensitive, observant, 
upper-class drawing instructor, has engaged 
himself  in a colonial adventure to the wild 
and untamed lands of  the America’s. Unable 
to colonize Laura and control the insecurity 
she stirs in him, he literally goes to another 
country to colonize other peoples, trying to 
resolve his inability to solve the former situa-
tion by succeeding in the latter venture. 
Walter returns from the “wilds and forests 
of  Central America”21 months later as a self-
described “changed man.”22 His “wander-
ings” and his repeated “escape[s] from the 
peril[s] of  death” have “tempered [his] nature 
afresh,”23 teaching his will “to be strong, 
[his] heart to be resolute, [his] mind to rely 
on itself.”24 Furthermore, Walter’s hyper-
masculine travels are later compounded and 
intensified by his own sleuth-like actions of  
surveillance and interrogation as he pursues 
proof  of  Laura’s existence. At this point in 
the narrative, Walter’s flawless representation 
of  Lacanian theory becomes more compli-
cated. Walter literally transforms himself  
into the stereotypical model of  masculinity 
that he always wanted himself  to be: active, 
dominant, socially and monetarily superior, 
omniscient (via his “objective” fact find-
ing), and heroic in his self-sacrificing ac-
tions. Throughout the course of  the novel, 
ly, though his adventures in Central America 
do not instantly resolve Walter’s relationship 
with Laura, the novel suggests that they do 
provide him with the unique (and arguably 
impossible) ability to resolve the foundational 
insecurity of  “The Gaze” by becoming his 
Ideal-I and thereby conquering Laura, the 
locus of  his anxiety, in the future.
Despite the novel’s implication that 
Walter had, through a radical change of  
character, overcome the basic anxiety sepa-
rating him from Laura, the actualization of  
their relationship is again delayed, this time 
because of  a “problem” in Laura’s character. 
Her traumatic entanglement with the life of  
Anne Catherick, the woman in white, forces 
her (via Count Fosco’s actions) to adopt the 
identity, position, and mentality of  a “lu-
natic.” This deliberate confusion of  identi-
ties and Laura’s subsequent confinement to 
an asylum under Anne’s name powerfully 
affects Laura’s originally reflective personal-
ity, compelling her to not only “play” the 
part of  Anne for mere show, but to actually 
become Anne. Just as Walter is easily able to 
influence Laura’s mind and persuade her to 
reflect him perfectly, so too does Anne’s life 
Laura possesses no self-knowledge or means for 
self-reflection beyond the stimuli and opinions of 
the characters that surround her; like the stereo-
typically “good” woman, she exists for and through 
others, desiring nothing beyond appeasement. 
Their relationship is entirely “wanting”: one par-
ticipant is completely translucent while the other 
is both in love with and unsettled by his own 
idealized reflection.
one another. The nature of  Walter’s desire 
for Laura—being that it is merely a masked 
reiteration of  Primary Narcissism—implies 
that, by gazing at her (and having her gaze 
back at him), Walter is simultaneously feed-
ing his narcissistic idealized self- image and 
troubling that image by constantly reminding 
himself  of  his own lack in comparison to 
the image. Walter attempts to verbalize this 
uncanny15 paradox by again speaking of  the 
ambiguous “lack” in Laura’s character, saying 
that “At one time it seemed like something 
wanting in her; at another, like something 
wanting in myself  . . . The impression was 
always strongest, in the most contradictory 
manner, when she looked at me . . . Some-
thing wanting, something wanting—and 
where it was, and what it was, I could not 
say.”16 The fact that this “wanting” occurs 
most acutely when Laura is gazing at Walter, 
fixing her reflective eyes on him, speaks to 
Lacan’s assumption that “The Gaze” is es-
sentially coded with both the narcissism of  
love for the Ideal-I (as represented to us, in 
the Symbolic Order, through others) and 
anxiety over the reality that no one measures 
watch Laura whenever possible. The insecu-
rity that his idealized reflection of  himself  
awakens prompts Walter to try to master that 
anxiety, to overcome it by perpetually staring 
at it. His repeated glances at and observa-
tions of  Laura are thereby read not as looks 
of  love, but as an almost colonial desire to 
gain control over and possess the unstable 
root of  his fear. Despite his best (subcon-
scious) efforts, though, Walter is never able 
to overcome the anxiety described in Lacan’s 
version of  the Castration Complex because, 
according to Lacan, the insecurity has noth-
ing to do with the object petit a, which func-
tions merely as a screen and has everything 
to do with our own latent recognition of  the 
fact that we do not measure up to our ideal-
ized self-image. This internal disquiet can 
in no way be overcome by controlling the 
object, the mirror, the other person, because 
it stems from something internal to the self  
rather than external to it. 
Unable to master the uneasiness he 
experiences every time he encounters Laura, 
Walter decides to leave Limmeridge in an 
attempt to “cast off  the oppression under 
he morphs from a passive and subordinate 
drawing teacher to a masculine but beneficent 
“savior” who literally fights to save Laura’s 
oppressor, Percival Glyde, from a fire. In a 
sense, through his missionary wanderings and 
his detective investigations, Walter changes 
himself  into his Ideal-I; he really and truly 
becomes everything that he previously ideal-
ized himself  to be and yet subconsciously 
never quite believed that he was. Interesting-
and surroundings leave its mark on Laura, 
temporarily making her like Anne. 
Laura’s assumption of  much of  Anne’s 
mentality and personality, as well as her name, 
becomes the reason, then, that Walter stops 
desiring her for a time after her return. In 
recounting Laura’s physical appearance when 
she returns to Marian and him, he states: 
The sorrow and suffering which I had 
once blamed myself  for associating . . . 
“Untitled” by Margaret Griffiths
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with the future of  Laura Fairlie had set 
their profaning marks on the youth and 
beauty of  her face. The fatal resemblance 
[between Laura and Anne] which I had 
once seen and shuttered at seeing, in idea 
only, was now a real and living resemblance 
which asserted itself  before my eyes.25
His love for her changes from a passionate 
desire for her former mirror-like state to 
“an interest of  tenderness and compassion, 
which her father or her brother might have 
felt” 26 because she could no longer serve as 
a perfectly reflective body. The confusion 
between she and Anne forces to Laura to 
take on Anne’s identity for a time, meaning 
that she is no longer flat and reflective—she 
had a personality, even if  it was not her own. 
True to all accounts of  narcissistic self-love, 
Walter cannot find Laura attractive and desir-
able until she stops mirroring Anne’s image 
and again begins to reflect to him his own. 
Walter’s love for Laura is so tied to his own 
Primary Narcissism (which Lacan theorizes 
that we never truly abandon as we transition 
sally relegating her to the role of  a passively 
reflective surface for her dominant counter-
parts. Laura possesses no self-knowledge or 
means for self-reflection beyond the stimuli 
and opinions of  the characters that surround 
her; like the stereotypically “good” woman, 
she exists for and through others, desiring 
nothing beyond appeasement. 
Laura’s gradual return to her old self—if  
she can even be said to have an independent 
“self ” at all—likewise signals the progres-
sive reemergence of  Walter’s desire for 
Laura. This “happy change” in her character 
“awoke” “those imperishable memories 
of  [their] past life in Cumberland” 28 and 
rekindled the flames of  Walter’s previ-
ous narcissistic desire for Laura. The pair 
finally “own that [they] love each other”29 
and, soon after this declaration, are hap-
pily married. Implicitly, through Walter’s 
reconstruction of  his own character, he has 
literally fashioned himself  into his Ideal-I, 
removing the anxiety that once plagued his 
earlier relationship with Laura. While Walter 
she was mine at last! Mine to support, to 
protect, to cherish, to restore. Mine to love 
and honor . . . Mine to vindicate through all 
risks and all sacrifices.”30 Walter’s final joy 
in marriage comes from the fact that he can 
now, fully and completely, own and master 
Laura; she is his love, his looking-glass, his 
mirror whose image he can now constantly 
and securely worship. His happiness is not 
the arguably fictionalized and romanticized 
happiness of  loving another person for 
“who s/he is”; rather, it is the overwhelm-
ing pleasure of  loving something that reflects 
back to you your own perfection—a perfec-
tion about which you hold no insecurities  
or doubts. 
Although the novel follows Laura and 
Walter’s matrimonial life for another few 
months, detailing Laura’s return to her 
proper social place (only achieved by Wal-
ter’s fact-finding), Count Fosco’s murder, 
and ending with the birth of  Laura and Wal-
ter’s first child, “Mr. Walter Hartwright—the 
heir of  Limmeridge,” the text does nothing to 
complicate the rather simplistic ideal of  the 
pair’s “happiness.”31 In a sense, then, The 
Woman in White resolves itself  in a way simi-
lar to many Victorian novels: all troubles are 
overcome, desire is satiated, and the “good 
guys” triumph. It suggests, through Walter’s 
character and his relationship with Laura, 
that the fundamental Lacanian notion of  
continual self-misrecognition and anxiety can 
eventually be resolved. Lacan’s understand-
ing of  objet petit a’s as primarily functioning 
as a screen for our own narcissistic pro-
jections requires Lacan to theorize desire 
as something inescapably and necessarily 
reproducing. Because our anxiety about our 
fragmented selves stems from an infantile 
separation from the mother—an event we 
can never reconstruct or overcome—our 
desire for our Ideal-I can never be achieved 
because our Ideal-I, that unified self, can 
never be returned to. Therefore, in the 
world away from romanticized and fictional-
ized constructs, desire can never be satiated; 
it is a perpetual reiteration of  itself, always 
re-projecting as soon as the original objet 
petit a is attained. 
Perhaps, given my meta-psychoanalytic 
perspective, I would hold this type of  narra-
tive resolution, often seen in fairy-tales, melo-
drama and fiction of  every genre (romance 
novel, of  course, as the exempla par excellence), 
as problematic because it falsely presents 
to the reader a psychologically impossible 
(yet desirable) scenario as if  it were truth, 
essentially constructing inaccurate delusions 
of  “reality” in readers’ mentality. Poisoned 
by the idealistic Victorian ending, lovers of  
fiction often point to novels as if  they are 
textualized versions of  truth, thus falling into 
the trap (and a seductive trap it is, indeed) 
of  mistaking for reality what is simply fic-
tion. Freud, quite famously, actually seeks to 
explain this literary and artistic tendency of  
representing a false yet attractive reality by 
applying his own theories of  narcissism to 
the artists and writer, reading their urge to 
materialize lies as representative of  the art-
ist’s own fumbling attempts to transcend his 
or her own anxiety: “The artist desires to win 
honour, power, wealth, fame, and the love of  
women; but he lacks the means for achiev-
ing these satisfactions” in the “real” world 
and so turns to art and writing to create a 
delusional resolution that would otherwise be 
unobtainable.32 From this Freudian meta-
perspective, the artist is necessarily narcissis-
tic because every production, every creative 
expression, represents nothing more than 
“an introvert[’s]” own desire to “[make] his 
dreams come true” and then take pleasure 
from that creative extension of  himself.33 
Artists’ fictionalized worlds are not the result 
of  spontaneous bursts of  genius, but are in-
dicative of  authors’ own quasi-neurotic states 
and their vain attempts to stabilize those 
states through the work they produce. Often, 
they—like the characters they produce—are 
subject to being read as a living embodiment 
of  the very paradigms of  narcissism Freud 
assumed to be mentally ubiquitous and are 
repositioned from the pedestal of  “creator” 
to the couch of  the psychoanalyst. 
Walter’s final joy in marriage comes from the 
fact that he can now, fully and completely, own 
and master Laura; she is his love, his looking-
glass, his mirror whose image he can now 
constantly and securely worship.
out of  the Imaginary Order) that he physi-
cally cannot desire her until she returns to 
her former passive, womanly state. Laura 
does eventually return to her former self, 
but this return comes at the high cost of  
her memories, which, “from the period of  
her leaving Blackwater Park to the period of  
our meeting in the burial ground of  Lim-
meridge Church, [were] lost beyond all hope 
of  recovery.”27 Her existence again assumes 
the domain of  immanence traditionally at-
tributed to women, characterized as having 
no ability for analytic thought, and univer-
always feels that something about his former 
relationship with Laura is “oppressive” or 
“wanting” because he can never completely 
master his own shortcomings and incongrui-
ties, the novel’s portrayal of  the reunited 
couple as “happy” and contented speaks to 
the idea that Walter has done the impossible: 
he has overcome his Lacanian Castration 
Complex and become his Ideal-I. In the 
most extreme instance of  Walter’s objectify-
ing triumph at finally feeling control over 
Laura, Walter rants: “In the right of  her 
calamity, in the right of  her friendlessness, 
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